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I. INTRODUCTION

In an important and certainly timely article published in the
N.Y. U. Law Review, Nancy C. Staudt demonstrates that, in taxpayer
standing cases, judges are motivated by politics but can be constrained
when the law is clear and oversight exists.1 As part of that
demonstration, Professor Staudt offers an empirical analysis of the
decision to grant standing to federal taxpayers-the results of which
we reproduce in Table 1.2
Table 1

Spending

Spending and
Establishment
Clause
Party of the
Appointing
President
Plaintiff Politics

Plaintiff Sought
Standing on More
Than One Ground
Court Discussed
Standing
Case Decided
After Flast v
Cohen
Constant

Federal Taxpayer
N = 120
B = -1.345
S.E. = .544
P= .013*
B = 1.212
S.E. =.501
p =.015*
B =.148
S.E. = .485
p = .760
B = 1.141
S.E. = .488
p = .019*
B =-.240
S.E. = .447
p = .591
B =-.973
S.E. =.583
p = .095
B =.098
S.E. =.574
p =.941
B =.806
S.E. = .978
p = .409

Table 1: Results of Nancy C. Staudt's analysis of the decision to grant standing (coded
1) or not (coded 0) to federal taxpayers. Each cell contains coefficient estimates from a
logistic regression model, (asymptotic) standard errors, and p-values. * indicates that p
<.05.

1.
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 617 (2004).
2.
Id. at 657. Using data generously provided to us by Professor Staudt, Table 1 parallels
the "Federal Taxpayer" model in Table 3 of her article. We have reinserted the negative signs
that were left out of the original publication of the article.
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What are we to make of this rather ominous-looking table?
Professor Staudt suggests two key takeaways. First, the analysis, she
reports, shows that doctrine helps explain standing decisions even
when political factors are taken into account. Both legal variables
("Spending" and "Spending and Establishment Clause") are
statistically significant, controlling for all other factors listed in the
table. Second, she finds an important role for the politics of the
plaintiff: Judges are more likely to grant standing to a liberal plaintiff,
regardless of their own political leanings.
No doubt, the data support Professor Staudt's claim about the
importance of politics. The asterisk on the Plaintiff Politics variable,
for example, tells us that a "statistically significant" relationship
exists between a plaintiffs political ideology and the decision to grant
3
standing.
Moreover, the positively signed coefficient (1.141, and not
-1.141) conveys information about the direction of that relationship:
Given Staudt's coding rules, and accounting for the other six variables
in her analysis, liberal plaintiffs are significantly more likely than
conservative plaintiffs to receive a favorable decision on their standing
claim.
On the other hand, Table 1 is not just ominous-looking and offputting to most readers; it communicates information of little value
either to its audience or author. For starters, while we know that
liberal plaintiffs are more likely to be granted standing, we do not
learn how much more likely. 0.2 times more likely? Two times? Or
perhaps even four times? Certainly, this is the quantity of interest
that matters most to readers. 4 But it is not one that we can readily
learn from a tabular display of coefficients; in fact, all we learn from
the coefficient of 1.141 is that, controlling for all other factors, as we
move from a conservative plaintiff to a liberal plaintiff, we move up
5
about 1 on a logit scale-an esoteric statement at best.
Moreover, even if we could calculate a "best guess" about the
likelihood of standing for a plaintiff based on political ideology, Table
1 conveys no useful information about the error surrounding that
guess. Suppose Professor Staudt reported that the probability of a
A relationship is said to be "statistically significant" if its existence cannot be explained
3.
by chance alone. The term is shorthand for rejecting a null hypothesis of no effect. See ALAN
AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 174 (3d ed. 1997).

4.
Indeed, to assess any conclusions authors draw, we need to know whether "statistically
significant" has any substantive effect. In Professor Staudt's case, her conclusion that judges
with different attributes reach different decisions would have a good deal more punch if states
were, say, twice as likely to commute the sentences of women, rather than 0.2 times more likely.
To make matters worse, because the logit scale is non-linear, moving up 1.141 units will
5.
result in different probabilities of clemency depending on where we start on the scale.
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judge granting standing to a conservative plaintiff is about 0.40, while
it is 0.60 for a liberal plaintiff. That would seem to constitute a big
substantive difference. But this difference is not necessarily very
important if the 95% confidence interval surrounding the 0.40 was
[0.19-0.59], meaning that "[o]ur best guess about the probability of
standing for conservatives is 0.40 but it could be as low as 0.19 and as
high as 0.59 (which is very close to 0.60, our best guess for liberals)."
Such is the reality of the statistical world: We can never be certain
about our best guesses (i.e., inferences) because they themselves are
based on estimates. We can, however, report our level of uncertainty
6
(e.g., a confidence interval) about those guesses.
In making these points, we do not mean to pick on Professor
Staudt. Quite the opposite: In many other ways, her article is
exemplary empirical scholarship. 7 But her work also demonstrates the
problems legal scholars confront when attempting to convey their
research results. Indeed, based on a survey we conducted of law
review articles making use of quantitative data, we can safely say that
nearly each and every one would have benefited from greater
8
attention to the communication of their results.
Indeed the benefits are many. Most crucially, it seems nearly
incontrovertible that moving towards more appropriate and accessible
presentations of data will heighten the impact of empirical legal
scholarship on its intended audience-be that audience other
academics, students, policy makers, lawyers, or judges-not to
mention raise the level of intellectual discourse among scholars
themselves. 9 When analysts write that "the coefficient on Plaintiff
Politics is statistically significant at the 0.05 level," they likely
immediately turn off many potential their readers. But if they were to
translate their findings into a visual display, as we do in Figure 1,
they would be able to supplant sterile statistical claims with the far
more pleasing: "Other things being equal, the estimated probability of
a liberal plaintiff being granted standing in a federal taxpayer lawsuit
is .41 (though it could be as low as .25 or as high as .60).10 That
6.
Most scholars, Professor Staudt included, appreciate this fact and supply the error
surrounding their estimated coefficients. But, as even the brief example in the text shows, this is
far less useful than conveying uncertainty about the substantive effect of the results.
7.
We also should note that Professor Staudt was one of the few scholars out of the many
we contacted who was willing to share her data-yet again underscoring the need for replication
policies in the law reviews.
8.
For more on our survey, see infra Part II.
9.
This paragraph adopts and parallels sentiments expressed in Gary King, Michael Tomz
& Jason Wittenburg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and
Presentation,44 AM. J.POL. SC. 347, 347-48 (2000).

10.

The figures .25 and .60 represent the 95% confidence interval.
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probability decreases for conservative plaintiffs, to only .18 (though it
could be low as .08 or as high as .38)."11 Unlike the terms "coefficient"
or "0.05 level," this statement is easy to understand even by the most
12
statistically challenged among us.
Figure 1

Predicted Probability of Granting Standing
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0

cio
CD
CD

CD

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of being granted standing for conservative and liberal
plaintiffs, from the results in Table 1. We held all dichotomous covariates at their
sample modes and all others at their sample means. The vertical (error) bars represent
95%~ confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities.

How can legal academics develop such claims from their data?
How might they go about visually depicting these claims? In what
follows we draw on a growing literature in the social and statistical
sciences to delineate, first, general principles for communicating the
fruits of empirical legal research (Part III) and for graphing
quantitative information (Part TV). In the next installment of this
Article, we outline specific strategies for effectively (and accessibly)
presenting data and statistical results. From these strategies, we
devise a set of protocols for implementation by legal publications. We
11. The differential precision of these estimates is caused by the non-linearity of the model.
The predictions would differ in magnitude if we were to hold the other covariates at different
values.
12. It is important to note that while the confidence intervals for these two predictions
overlap, there is still a statistically significant difference between the predictions. See Peter C.
Austin & Janet E. Hux, A Brief Note on Overlapping Confidence Intervals, 36 J. vAscuLAR
SURGERY 194, 194-95 (2002) (explaining that two means can have confidence intervals that abut
or overlap and still be significantly different from one another).
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start, though, at the beginning-with our motivation for writing this
paper.
II. MOTIVATION
Why an article on the presentation of data and results? We
were driven by two separate forces: recent developments 1) in and 2)
beyond the legal academy. As we explain below, these coalesce.
Precisely at a moment when law professors desire to convey their
research to diverse audiences, other disciplines have made a good deal
of progress toward reaching that end.
A. Developments in the Legal Academy
To claim that empirical work is now a fundamental part of
legal scholarship borders on the boring. 13 It has been said (and
documented) too many times for us to recount here; even the
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") acknowledged the
increasing centrality of empirical work when it devoted its 2006
annual meeting to the topic.14 More important for our purposes is that
while law professors are increasingly making use of data in their
scholarship and while the data work housed in their studies is
(generally) of a high quality, its presentation could be improved.
This much we learned from a systematic analysis of articles,
essays, and notes published in twenty leading law reviews between
2000 and 2004.15 It will come as no great surprise that (quantitative)
13. We can differentiate between two types of evidence employed in empirical work:
quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (non-numerical). Though neither is any more
"empirical" than the other, our focus here is (generally) on the presentation of quantitative data.
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("The
word 'empirical' denotes evidence about the world based on observation or experience. That
evidence can be numerical (quantitative) or nonnumerical (qualitative); neither is any more
empirical than the other.").
14. "There is a long tradition of empirical scholarship in law and there has recently been a
burgeoning of interest in conducting empirical research in America's law schools." ASS'N OF AM.
LAW SCHOOLS, EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP: WHAT SHOULD WE STUDY AND HOW SHOULD WE STUDY
IT? 50 (2006), available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/program/finalprogrammain2OO6.pdf.
15. We included the twenty flagship, student-edited journals with the highest "impact" from
1997-2004. Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, http://lawlib.wlu.eduILJ/index.aspx (last
visited Nov. 22, 2004). They are (in order of impact): YALE LAW JOURNAL, COLUMBIA LAW
REVIEW, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, STANFORD LAW REVIEW,
CORNELL LAW REVIEW, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, UCLA LAW REVIEW, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW,
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW, TEXAS LAW REVIEW,
DUKE LAW JOURNAL, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
REVIEW, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, WILLIAM AND MARY LAW
REVIEW, IOWA LAW REVIEW, AND MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW. For the figures that follow in the text,
we counted all articles, notes, and essays.
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evidence-whether in the text, tables, or figures-appears in a nontrivial number: 245 of the 3695 total articles, to be precise. Also likely
to no one's surprise, methods for depicting data varied considerably,
from simple bar charts designed to summarize information collected
by the author to detailed tables meant to convey inferences about
information the author has not collected. Finally, the range of
substantive topics under scrutiny impressed us. From constitutional
law to commercial law, from statutory interpretation in the tax
context to the use of scientific evidence in criminal cases, from the
appointment through the retirement of judges, no subject now seems
beyond the reach of empirical analysis.
And yet it was the commonalities among the articles-and not
their differences-that struck us. On the one hand, as we suggest
above, the data work was competently executed. In only 18.8% of the
245 articles were we able to identify a statistical issue that required
some remedying. In a few instances, the problems were rather severe,
but in the great majority, they were far more minor: the occasional
missing N, the neglect of model fit, and so on. Clearly, law professors
have become adept data handlers.
On the other hand, as judged by emerging standards for
communicating data summaries and results, they are far less adept at
conveying information. So, for example, while most scientists have
"declared a war" on tables-or, at the least, have expressed a strong
preference for graphical displays-law professors seem to have
embraced them. 16 The 245 articles all made use of quantitative
evidence, but fewer than 40% (N = 92) employed figures; even when
conveying the results of multivariate statistical analyses, authors
commonly eschewed graphical displays for tables (i.e., Table 1 was the
rule, not the exception). Moreover, when figures did make their way
into the articles, they were often so "busy" or otherwise marred that

16. For more on the general principle of "graphs, not tables," see infra Part III.C. Worth
noting here, though, is that the preference for figures over tabular displays is hardly new. As
early as 1801, William Playfair, a "key figure in the history of quantitative graphics," wrote that
information "obtained [in charts] in five minutes... would require whole days to imprint on the
memory, in a lasting manner, by a table ..." Patricia Costigan-Eaves & Michael MacdonaldRoss, William Playfair (1759-1823), 5 STAT. SCI. 318, 318, 323 (1990) (emphasis omitted). With
new developments in the social and statistical sciences, see infra Part I.B, Playfair's sentiment
has become a near battle cry. This is not to say, however, that scientists always practice what
they preach. "Statisticians recommend graphical displays but often do not follow this
recommendation in presenting their own research." Andrew Gelman et al., Let's Practice What
We Preach: Turning Tables into Graphs, 56 AM. STATISTICIAN 121, 121 (2002). After reviewing
tables published in the March 2000 issue of the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL
ASSOCIATION, Gelman and his colleagues show that using well-designed graphs is actually

superior to using tables. Id.
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their impact was all but lost. 17 This is the case, in varying degrees, for
the trio of pictures we reproduce in Figure 2-all of which appeared in
law publications.
These are but three examples; the list of ills is longer, and we
devote most of this article to offering antidotes. But the basic point
should not be missed: A very large percentage of empirical work could
be improved if authors would pay as much attention to how they
present information as to how they collect and analyze it.
Figure 2
10/-87%
90h,

80YO97
''
83%

70

400/-

-

279t
300.
2000A

Entire Test

Vocabulary Test

Warnings Test

Concepts Test

li Disabled % Nondisabled

17.

For more on the concepts of "busyness" and "impact," see infra Part MA.
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Figure 2: Each panel displays a figure (reproduced from a law review article) that
obscures the data and thus interferes with visualization. The graph in the top panel is
cluttered with irrelevant elements, including the depth cue, internal data labels, tick
marks, and legend. The cross hatching and the number of tick marks is also distracting.
In the middle panel, the dark grid and legend obscure visualization of the data, as do
the non-circular subelements. In the bottom panel, the inclusion of zero obscures
patterns in the data, and the connected lines make it difficult to observe missing years
in the dataset. We offer correctives in Figures 9, 10, and 13.

The existence of this gap is not too surprising. While a spate of
books and articles provides guidance to law professors seeking to
undertake empirical work, we cannot identify one-not one-explicitly
geared toward supplying counsel on how to present data and results.1 8
18. E.g., Epstein & King, supra note 13, at 1 (delineating the "rules of inference" but having
very little to say about conveying data and research results). But see Id. at 26-27 (discussing
histograms). We can say the same of primers on social science methods, statistics, or both. E.g.,
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW (2002); MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN,
STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS (2001); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW
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By the same token, various legal style guides are silent with regard to
the communication of empirical evidence. As we might expect, THE
BLUEBOOK speaks only to the question of how to cite others' figures
and tables, not to matters of original presentation. Ditto for the
flagship law journals (or at least the ten we consulted). 19 Less
expected, though, is that relative to major journals in the sciences,
important peer-reviewed journals in law provide only skeletal
20
instructions to authors on how to convey numerical data.
(2006). An exception comes in the latter's claim that while "graphs are useful for revealing key
characteristics of a batch of numbers," readers must take care to examine their "markings" to
ensure that they are not conveying deceptive information. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra, at 177. For
more on the assumption that readers are "dumb" when it comes to decoding figures (but
apparently not in reading tables), see infra Part IV.
19. We visited the websites of the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, HARVARD LAW REVIEW,
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, NORTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW,
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REVIEW, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW, and YALE LAW JOURNAL.
20. The instructions for preparing figures and tables in the JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES ("JELS"), most of which deal with matters of format, are as follows:
Initial caps and italics are used for each major word in table column headings.
Only the first word is capitalized in table rows.
Horizontal lines separate the table heading from the table body and are also used at
the end of a table.
Initial caps are used for each major word in the title of tables: E.g., "Table 1: Number
of Verdicts in Tort Trials by Jurisdiction by Decade"
Only the first word of a figure title is capitalized. E.g., "Figure 1: Average and median
damage awards in tort verdicts by year."
Authors should strive to use a font in figures that is compatible with JELS's text font.
Times Roman is acceptable.
Tables and figures should stand on their own. When appropriate, authors should
include an explanatory note for a table or figure. The goal is to have the table or figure
"stand on its own" so that a busy reader can understand the table without reading the
whole article. JELS, Author Guidelines, http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/
submit.asp?ref= 1740- 1453&site= 1.
The JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION'S ("JLEO") instructions are even
skimpier. JLEO, Information for Authors, http://www.oxfordjournals.org/ourjournals/jleorg/
forauthors/ms.preparation.html. But JELS and JLEO pale in comparison to, say, NATURE, see
NATURE, Formatting Guide: Manuscript Preparation and Submission, http://www.nature.com/
nature/authors/gta/index.html, or even POLITICAL ANALYSIS, the journal of the Political
Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association and the Society for Political
Methodology, which also contains detailed instructions for the preparation of tables (though not
graphs):
Numbers in the text of articles and in tables should be reported with no more
precision than they are measured and are substantively meaningful. In general, the
number of places to the right of the decimal point for a measure should be one more
than the number of zeros to the right of the decimal point on the standard error of this
measure.
Variables in tables should be rescaled so the entire table (or portion of the table) has a
uniform number of digits reported. A table should not have regressions coefficients
reported at, say, 77000 in one line and .000046 in another. By appropriate rescaling
(e.g., from thousands to millions of dollars, or population in millions per square mile
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In short, while law professors face no shortage of sources from
which to learn about research design, data analysis, and citation
practices, they lack a standard reference or even basic guidance on
how to convey the fruits of their labors. This would be less than
optimal for researchers working in any discipline, but it is uniquely
problematic for legal academics. Perhaps more than most, law
professors have a strong interest in conveying their results to both the
statistically informed and uninformed. Moving away from rather
meaningless statements-meaningless, at least, to most lawyers,
policy makers, judges, and even fellow law professors-about
"regression coefficients," "statistical significance," and "p-values,"
towards displays housing estimates of key quantities of substantive
interest may therefore provide especially large payoffs for legal
researchers and their audiences.
If this is so, then King et al.'s wise words-that the "raw
results of any statistical procedure ...
[should] require little
specialized knowledge to understand" 21-are particularly apt for law
professors. Only by following them will they and their communities in
and outside the faculty commons reap the full benefits of empirical
work.

to population in thousands per square mile), it should be possible to provide
regression coefficients that are easily comprehensible numbers. The table should
clearly note the rescaled units. Rescaled units should be intuitively meaningful, so
that, for example, dollar figures would be reported in thousands or millions of dollars.
The rescaling of variables should aid, not impede, the clarity of a table.
In most cases, the uncertainty of numerical estimates is better conveyed by confidence
intervals or standard errors (or complete likelihood functions or posterior
distributions), rather than by hypothesis tests and p-values. However, for those
authors who wish to report "statistical significance," statistics with probability levels
of less than .001, .01, and .05 may be flagged with 3, 2, and 1 asterisks, respectively,
with notes that they are significant at the given levels. Exact probability values may
always be given. POLITICAL ANALYsIs follows the conventional usage that the
unmodified term "significant" implies statistical significance at the 5% level. Authors
should not depart from this convention without good reason and without clearly
indicating to readers the departure from convention.
It cannot be stressed too much that all articles should strive for maximal clarity.
Choices about figures, tables, and mathematics should be made so as to increase
clarity. In the end all decisions about clarity must be made by the author (with some
help from referees and editors).
POL. ANALYSIS, Information for Authors, http://www.oxfordjournals.org/polana/forauthors/
general.html.
21. King et al., supra note 9, at 347. Daniel B. Wright puts it this way: "A second year
undergraduate should be able to read the results section, on its own, and know what the main
findings are." Daniel B. Wright, Making Friends with Your Data, 73 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
123, 132 (2003).
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B Developments Outside the Legal Academy
Surely the existing state of the legal literature was a key
motivating factor for this Article, but it is hardly the only one.
Actually, we would have been unable to offer a corrective in the
absence of developments external to the legal academy. 22 Three are
23
worthy of mention.
First, a burgeoning literature in the statistical and social
sciences focused on the presentation of data has arisen in response to
the growing prevalence of data displays, and especially graphs in
scholarly works. 24 Some of this amounts to little more than
"armchair," though valuable, guidelines for graphic design. 25 But other
work-and there is a good deal of it-invokes observational and
experimental evidence to learn about how accurately and quickly
people perceive and process information presented to them in prose
26
versus tables versus graphs.
22. We focus here on relatively recent developments. For discussions of the evolution of
data graphs, see generally, EDWARD R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE
INFORMATION (2d ed. 2001); Howard Wainer & Paul F. Velleman, Statistical Graphics:Mapping
the Pathways of Science, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 305 (2001).
23. We are not the first to take note of recent developments in the visualization of data and
results. E.g., WILLIAM G. JACOBY, STATISTICAL GRAPHICS FOR UNIVARIATE AND BIVARIATE DATA 1
(1997) (pointing to "advances in graphical methodologies," new research on graphical perception,
and "the rapid evolution and widespread availability of powerful computing equipment"); Wainer
& Velleman, supra note 22, at 314 (discussing the importance of "cheap powerful computing" and
advances in software).
24. "Graphing data as a means of communicating information has become increasingly
prevalent. [One study reports] an estimated increase from 900 billion statistical graphs
published in 1983 to 2.2 trillion published in 1994." Martin H. Fischer, Do IrrelevantDepth Cues
Affect the Comprehension of Bar Graphs?, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 151, 151 (2000).
Growth has come not only in the natural and social sciences, but also in popular magazines and
corporate reports. See, e.g., Vivien A. Beattie & Michael John Jones, Changing Graph Use in
CorporateAnnual Reports, 17 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 213 (2000); Vivien Beattie & Michael John
Jones, The Use and Abuse of Graphs in Annual Reports: Theoretical Framework and Empirical
Study, 22 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 291 (1992).
25. Fischer uses the term "armchair" to describe principles for graphic design that are
based on intuition rather than empirical evidence. Fischer, supra note 24, at 152. By way of
example, he points to Tufte's "data-ink ratio" principle. Id.; see generally TUFTE, supra note 22,
at 91-105. See also Jerry Lohse, A Cognitive Model of the Perception and Understanding of
Graphs, 8 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 353 (1993) ("[It is essential that graphic design [has]
a sound scientific foundation"). While we think Tufte has made important contributions to the
visualization of quantitative information, we generally agree with Fischer. See infra Part IV.
26. There are many articles and books devoted to this topic. A few prominent (or
interesting) examples include: WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA (2d
ed. 1994) [hereinafter CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS]; WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, VISUALIZING DATA
(1993); STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN, ELEMENTS OF GRAPHIC DESIGN (1993); William S. Cleveland &
Robert McGill, Graphical Perception: Theory, Experimentation, and Application to the
Development of GraphicalMethods. 79 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 531 (1984); Fischer, supra note 24, at
161 (demonstrating that "irrelevant depth cues" slow down graph comprehension); Stephan
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Because we integrate many lessons of this literature
throughout, one example serves to make the point here: the poor
27
performance of certain "pop charts"-but most notoriously pie charts.
No less than William S. Cleveland, a towering figure in the field of
data visualization, has demonstrated that pie charts so often mask
important patterns and other properties of the data that researchers
should outright reject them. 28 In their place (and based on his research
on pattern perception), Cleveland suggests dot plots-a category of
charts underdeployed in the law reviews but used prominently in
29
many other disciplines.
We wholeheartedly endorse Cleveland's advice, and Figure 3
shows why. There we provide two visual depictions of the same
data-juxtaposed pie charts (with six slices or sectors in the form of
percentages) and a dot plot (with each dot representing a
30
percentage).

Lewandowsky & Ian Spence, Discriminating Strata in Scatterplots, 84 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 682
(1989); Ian Spence & Stephan Lewandowsky, DisplayingProportionsand Percentages, 5 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 61 (1991) (presenting experimental results which indicate that charts are
superior to tables).
27. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 262-63, uses the term "pop chart" to refer to
three graphs (pie, divided bar, and area charts) that often appear in media and business
publications. While Cleveland claims that these are rare in scientific journals, we found an
ample presence in the law reviews.
28. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 263; Cleveland & McGill, supra note 26, at
545. Many others agree. See, e.g., JACQUES BERLIN, GRAPHICS AND GRAPHIC INFORMATION 111

(1981) (describing multiple pie charts, in particular, as "completely useless"); TUFTE, supra note
22, at 178 ("[P]ie charts should never be used"). But see Spence & Lewandowsky, supra note 26,
at 61 (suggesting that, unless the judgment is a "complicated one," pie charts are not as inferior
to bar charts as most of the literature suggests). However, some of the Spence & Lewandowsky
experiments compared pie charts to stacked bar charts, an equally problematic display.
29. Cleveland & McGill, supra note 26, at 545 ("A pie chart can always be replaced by a bar
chart... [but] we prefer dot charts .... ").
30. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 569 (2002) (depicting the pie charts).
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Figure 3: The stacked pie charts on the top depict the types of business conduct at issue
in antitrust litigation in health care. We present the same data on the bottom with
stacked dot plots. The dot plots are superior because they facilitate look-up of the data
patterns; they also, by providing a common baseline, ease comparisons within and
31
between the juxtaposed panels.

The pie charts are designed to depict the types of business
conduct at issue in antitrust litigation in health care, but two general
problems are immediately apparent. First, decoding data patterns
(the so-called "lookup") becomes an unnecessarily demanding cognitive
task (with systematic biases) because it requires visually estimating
an angle (rather than estimating a length). 32 Second, it is hard,
visually, to detect differences in the data values because the pieces of
the pie do not share a common baseline. 33 Looking at the top pie panel
in Figure 3, for example, can you discern whether "Insurance" or
"Other" are the bigger pieces? How about the difference between
"Exclusive Contracting" and "Information" in the bottom pie? Now try
comparing pieces of the pie across the two panels. Owing to the lack of
a common baseline, this too is no easy task. The dot plots, in contrast,
31. Id.
32. See CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 245, 264 (providing basis from which this
discussion is adapted).
33. See Cleveland & McGill, supra note 26, at 545 (providing basis from which this
discussion is adapted).
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have the advantage of common baseline, which facilitates comparisons
34
among the "pieces."
Until recently, lessons of this sort pertained mostly to the
communication of quantitative information, rather than statistical
results. In other words, Cleveland, among other important figures in
the field, 35 focused almost exclusively on developing principles for the
display of raw data or summaries of those data (as in all the panels of
Figures 2 and 3). But now-and this brings us to a second prominent
development-scholars have moved beyond articulating theories for
displaying data and towards developing techniques for presenting the
results of statistical analyses. 36 As even our brief demonstration in the
Introduction suggests (see Figure 1), these emerging strategies have
the potential to transform the field of empirical legal scholarship, and
we make use of them throughout the article.
In so doing, we employ sophisticated software-yet a third
development motivating our work here. Just a decade ago, scholars
hoping to present their results or even raw data faced a problem of no
small proportion: a dearth of software able to meet their needs. The
ever-popular Microsoft Excel was no more up to the task then than it
is now, but neither were existing statistical packages (such as SAS
and SPSS). No longer. These days, scholars can deploy Stata (along
with modules that they can import into it37) or R, an open source
implementation of the S language (also available as the commercial SPlus package), to create sophisticated, yet accessible, data
presentations.3 8 What both Stata and R have in common is the ability

34. These are but two problems with pie charts. Other issues with those in Figure 3 are,
first, the internal data labels are unnecessary, and the shading patterns are difficult to discern
(especially between "Insurance" and "Other"). Moreover, the raw percentages in each pie chart do
not sum to 100%, which may raise questions about the integrity of the data, and the manner in
which the authors constructed the graphs.
35. See, e.g., JOHN W. TUKEY, EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 99-101 (1977) (exploring
alternative forms of displaying summaries of data).
36. See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 16, at 121 (examining the fact that while
statisticians recommend graphs, they often do not use them in their own work, and
recommending ways to improve presentations through the use of graphs); King et al., supra note
9, at 347 (describing techniques to "extract the currently overlooked information and present it
in a reader-friendly manner").
37. See King et al., supra note 9, app. at 360 (describing Clarify, a program which is not a
graphing package but rather a freely available software program that converts statistical results
into estimates of quantities of interest, along with estimates of the uncertainty surrounding
those estimates, and the ability to depict these numbers, including confidence intervals,
visually); see also http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify/docs/clarify.html
(providing links to
instructions for installing Clarify, along with the documentation necessary to use it).
38. There are a number of software packages dedicated to statistical computing. The most
popular commercial packages are Stata, http://www.stata.com, SPSS, http://www.spss.com, SPLUS, http://www.insightful.com, and SAS, http://www.sas.com. R, http://www.r-project.org, is
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to customize all the fine features of a particular figure, and to create
(and, more importantly, re-create) figures rapidly using scripts. (By
the same token, the advent of fast computers on the desktop is
another technological development that makes possible some of the
strategies we describe below. Indeed, many of these methods require
computationally intensive simulations that would have been
prohibitively expensive in the 1990s.)
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR COMMUNICATING DATA AND RESULTS

If legal scholars have the tools for communicating more
effectively and are motivated to do so, what they lack is guidance on
how to do so. We hope to change this by offering sets of strategies for
presenting data and results. We begin, though, with three general
principles that all data work should strive to follow: (1) Communicate
substance, not statistics; (2) When communicating substantive results
(that is, when performing inference), also communicate uncertainty;
(3) Regardless of whether the communication is of results or data,
generally use graphical,not tabular, displays.
A. Communicate Substance, not Statistics
In perusing the data work in law-related articles, we were
struck by the authors' emphasis on statistics over substance. More
often than not they claim that their result is "statistically significant
at the .05 level," without ever communicating very much, if anything,
39
about the effect of that result.
Staudt's study of taxpayer standing provides an example, 40 as
does an article by Epstein and her colleagues on dissent in the U.S.
Supreme Court. 4' The overall goal of the Epstein, et al. project was to
assess the long-held belief that dissent rates remained low during the
42
19th century because the Court followed a "norm of consensus."
an open source implementation of the S language, and has become the linguq francaof statistical
computing. When managing data, creating graphs, or performing analyses, it is important to use
a dedicated statistical package.
39. A search in LEXIS's US & Canadian Law Review file for the last two years (1/1/200412/31/2005) on the term "statistically significant" brings up 853 documents. And while we cannot
say that many or even most of these articles fail to probe the substantive importance of the
"statistically significant" finding (or, for that matter, even present original results), we can say
that the majority of the 245 articles we examined neglected to do so.
40. Staudt, supra note 1, at 657-58.
41. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 362 (2001), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.
edu/researchjnorm.html (follow "click here for the article" link) (rounded to hundredths).
42.

Id.
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That is, the justices may have privately disagreed over the outcomes
of cases but masked their disagreement from the public by producing
consensual opinions.
To evaluate this claim, Epstein, et al. turned to Chief Justice
Morrison L. Waite's docket books, in which the chief recorded votes
cast during the Court's private conferences (1874-1888 terms). With
the private and public votes in hand, the Epstein team estimated
several multivariate logistic regression models, one of which we
43
reproduce in Table 2.
Table 2
Variable
Justice was in Conference Minority
Majority at Conference Affirmed Lower Court's Decision
Number of Years Justice Had Served on the Court
Ideological Distance between the Justice and the
Conference Majority
Conference Minority * Affirmed
Conference Minority * Years
Conference Minority * Ideological Distance
Intercept

Coefficient
7.588**
-0.812**
0.059**
0.018

(Std. Err.)
(0.591)
(0.251)
(0.020)
(0.039)

0.903**
-0.058
-0,014
-6.301**

(0.252)
(0.030)
(0.041)
(0.459)
22001

N
Log-likelihood
X2(7)

-1442.303
53981.23

Table 2: Results of the Epstein, et al. analysis of vote shifts on the Waite Court, 18741888 terms. This is a logistic regression with robust standard errors (clustered on
justice) in parentheses. ** indicates p <.01. The dependent variable is whether the
justice switched his vote (coded 1) or not (coded 0) between the time of the Court's
(private) initial conference and publication of the decision.44

In this model, the dependent variable is whether a justice
shifted his vote between the time of the Court's (private) initial
conference and publication of the decision (regardless of whether the
shift was in the direction of the minority or the majority). The
independent variable of primary interest is "Conference Minority": If,
according to Epstein et al., a justice was in the minority and switched
to the majority (controlling for all other possible explanations of vote
switching), that would provide evidence of a norm of consensus. Note
that the authors also take into account other possibilities for shifts; for
example, whether the majority initially affirmed the lower court's
decision. The expectation here is that justices are less likely to exhibit

43.
44.

Id. at 374-75.
Id.
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fluidity in "easy" cases, which the researchers take to be those the
45
Court affirmed at its private conference.
A mere glance at the results in Table 2 seems to confirm
Epstein and her colleagues' conclusion that these hypotheses bear out.
The two variables, "Conference Minority" and "Affirm," produce, as
46
the authors note, "significant coefficients."
Hence, Epstein, et al. are not wrong (note the ** indicating p >
.01) but neither should we be impressed with the emphasis on
statistical significance inherent in tabular displays like theirs (see
also Table 1). First, no doubt some of the "statistically significant"
estimates are of course substantively uninteresting. Take the
"Affirmed" variable in Table 2. Given the authors' coding, it is in fact
the case that justices were less likely to switch their votes if the
majority initially affirmed the lower court's decision. But the effect of
"Affirmed" is truly trivial. All other things being equal, the predicted
probability of a first-year justice changing his vote is .0020; 47 that
figure drops to .0008 when the Court voted to affirm. 48 Certainly a
difference, but one we cannot imagine being of interest to any reader
or, for that matter, the researchers themselves.
On the other hand, by focusing readers' attention solely on
matters of statistical significance, analysts can understate the
importance of their results. This holds for the Epstein et al. project on
dissent 49 and Staudt's article on standing, 50 along with many of the
others we examined. Consider Mark J. Roe's important paper in the
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, which developed a simple but elegant theory:
"[S]ocial democracies widen the natural gap between managers and
distant stockholders, and impede firms from developing the tools that

45. Id. at 371 ("[G]iven the time period under analysis here-an era during which the
justices were flooded with cases that the lower courts had decided 'correctly' but that they were
forced to hear-[it is not a stretch to measure] easy cases [as] those the majority affirmed at
conference .... " (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
46. Id. at 373.
47. The 95% confidence interval is [.0008, .0043].
48. The 95% confidence interval is [.00043, .00154].
49. For example, while it is difficult to glean from Table 2, the substantive effect of
Conference Minority is substantial. All other things being equal, the predicted probability of a
justice switching his vote when he is in the minority at conference is a substantial .79 [.707,
.859].
50. See supra Part I (finding that, controlling for all other variables, the estimated
probability of a liberal plaintiff being granted standing is .41; that figure for a conservative
plaintiff was only. 18).
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would close that gap."5 1 When the gap widens sufficiently, it renders
52
"the large American-style public firm... unstable."
One observable implication of this account, according to Roe, is
that the more to the left the politics of a nation, the less diffuse
ownership. To assess it, he estimated a linear regression model with
the proportion of firms under diffuse ownership in the sixteen richest
nations as the dependent variable, and experts' assessment of the
nations' politics (from most left to most right) as the sole independent
variable.
Roe communicates his results in two forms: Table 3, which we
have replicated from his data, and the following statement: "these
results are statistically significant." 53 Yes, that is true, but all readers
should want to know "by how much?" That is, what is the practical
effect of politics on diffuse ownership? It turns out that had Roe
provided an answer to this question-the key question-his conclusion
would have been far more dramatic because the effect seems
substantial indeed: As we move from the most liberal societies to those
in the middle of the political spectrum, diffusion of ownership nearly
triples, from 16% 54 to 47%.55
Table 3
Variable
Nation's Politics

Coefficient
0.329**

(Std. Err.)
(0.090)

Intercept

-0.571

(0.289)

N
R2

SEE

16
0.489
0.212

Table 3: Mark J. Roe's regression of ownership on politics. ** indicates p < .01. The
dependent variable is the proportion of firms under diffuse ownership in the sixteen
richest nations; the independent variable is experts' assessment of the nations' politics
56
(from most left to most right).

Yet a second set of problems emerging when authors focus on
statistical significance to the neglect of substantive effect is that they
disservice their audiences in the short and long terms. In the short
term, and this returns us to a point we made in the Introduction, no
51. Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control,
53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 561 (2000).
52. Id. at 543.
53. Id. at 562.
54. The 95% confidence interval is [-3.5, 36.0].
55. The 95% confidence interval is [36.5, 57.2].
56. See Roe, supra note 51, at 562 (providing the data from which we produced this table).
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reader can possibly make (substantive) sense of the estimates in Table
2 (the Epstein, et al. table). All we can really say about the coefficient
of 7.59 (on the "Conference Minority" variable), to provide but one
example, is this: "Setting all other variables at 0, the log odds ratio of
switching by a justice in the conference minority increases (-6.30 [the
constant] + 7.59 = ) 1.29"-a rather meaningless statement to readers
regardless of their statistical prowess. The particular obstacle here is
that the model is nonlinear, meaning that one needs to know a good
deal about the explanatory variables to decipher the magnitude of the
coefficients. But even in the case of Roe's regression analysis, in which
the coefficients are easier to interpret because the model is linear, why
compel others to make the calculations (especially since many will not
know how)? More generally, in both instances the authors are missing
a prime opportunity to communicate with their readers. They are
failing to present results in a way that "require[s] little specialized
knowledge to understand"5 7 and thus to reach the widest possible
audience; they are instead limiting themselves to a very small sector
of the community.
In the longer term, the emphasis on statistical significance,
unaccompanied by any substantive message, can work to perpetuate
questionable interpretations. Under present practice in the law
reviews, it is entirely conceivable-in the absence of any statements or
displays about key quantities of interest-that ensuing articles will
report that "Affirmed" has a "statistically significant" effect on vote
shifts despite its trivial substantive impact. Actually, this is more
than a possibility. In perusing the law reviews, we are struck by the
extent to which subsequent authors convey a finding as "statistically
significant" (and sometimes third hand at that) without ever denoting
the substantive punch of the result. 58 Of course, we can hardly lay the
blame with the consumers of data work; it is the original
researchers' 59 responsibility to provide estimates of the key quantities
57.

King et al., supra note 9, at 347.

58.

E.g., Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 HARV. L. REV.

2726 (2005) (citations omitted). Judge Winter contends that a regime facilitating takeovers
would enhance shareholder value. To reconcile this belief with his view that state competition
benefits shareholders, Judge Winter argues that Delaware's antitakeover statute is relatively
innocuous. Professor Romano holds a similar position. Reviewing empirical studies on the effects
of takeover laws on shareholder wealth, she notes that "[elvent studies find either statistically
significant negative stock price effect or no effect." Id. at 2735 n.43.
59. E.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1491-92 (2005). Kang
describes a study by political scientists Frank Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar which communicated
substance and not merely statistical significance:
[The researchers] created variations of a local newscast: a control version
with no crime story, a crime story with no mugshot, a crime story with a
Black-suspect mugshot, and a crime story with a White-suspect mugshot.
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of interest.6 0 More importantly, they should want to communicate
substantive effects, for when they do, benefits accrue: it is those
effects, perhaps in addition to (or even in lieu of) claims about
statistical significance, that tend to get transported from study to
study-thus generating more precise knowledge about the work's key
findings.
In short, to begin reaping the benefits of empirical research,
researchers ought to move away from an emphasis on statistics and
towards substance (and readers ought demand that they do). At least
conceptually, this is not an especially difficult move. All it requires is
that analysts identify the quantity (or more likely quantities) of the
greatest interest or relevance to their project. Returning to the
example of Epstein and her colleagues, they were most concerned with
the extent to which the "norm of consensus" led justices in the
conference minority to switch their vote to the majority-meaning
that the "Conference Minority" variable was of the greatest interest to
them, though they had secondary interests in the others.
Once researchers have identified the variable(s) of interest it is
just a matter of computation to estimate a quantity of interest (along
with an assessment of uncertainty about that estimate). In
contemplating the 7.59 coefficient on the "Conference Minority"
variable, for example, why follow the crowd and write, "it is
statistically significant at the .01 level" when it is nearly as easy to
answer "how much effect does it exert?"6 1 Not only do various
statistical software packages enable researchers to estimate the
quantity of interest, but also because contemporary software packages
use simulations (repeated sampling of the model parameters from
The Black and White suspects were represented by the same morphed
photograph, with the only difference being skin hue-thus controlling for
facial expression and features. The suspect appeared for only five seconds in
a ten-minute newscast; nonetheless, the suspect's race produced statistically
significant differences in a criminal law survey completed after the viewing.
Having seen the Black suspect, White participants showed 6% more support
for punitive remedies than did the control group, which saw no crime story.
When participants were instead exposed to the White suspect, their support
for punitive remedies increased by only 1%, which was not statistically
significant.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. But see MOD. LANG. J., Frequently Asked Questions, http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/mlj/
submission.htm#faq6 ("Manuscripts often benefit from reporting effect sizes of both the new
study and studies cited in the literature review. To do the latter, it may be necessary to calculate
the effect size measures from data summaries or test statistics given in those cited studies. In
some cases, of course, such calculation will not be possible. Ideally, the author will relate the
effect size of the new study to those of previous studies.").
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting the dramatic effect of the Conference
Minority).
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their sampling distribution) to produce the estimate, researchers are
also capable of generating assessments of error (e.g., confidence
62
intervals.).
In the next Section we have more to say about the importance
of conveying error (uncertainty). For now it is worth noting that while
contemporary software is geared toward estimating quantities of
interest (and error) for the results of rather fancy models (as in the
cases of Staudt, Epstein, et al. and Roe), the same general principle of
"Communicate Substance, Not Statistics" applies with equal force to
simpler tools. Take the omnipresent Pearson chi-square (X2) statistic.
Just as too many authors merely note whether a regression coefficient
is "statistically significant" without providing a substantive
interpretation, those reporting X2 do likewise.
Moore's work on judges and juries in patent cases provides a
classic example. 63 The author is interested in determining whether
many in the legal community are right to be skeptical about the
ability of jurors to reach informed decisions in patent litigation. As she
puts it, "[T]here is a popular perception that the increasing complexity
of technology being patented.., has made patent trials extremely
difficult for lay juries to understand." 64 To assess this perception, she
collected data on all patent cases that went to trial, whether before a
judge or jury, between 1983-1999 (N = 1209).65 The top panel of Table
4, which we reproduce from the article, displays Moore's overall
results.

62. King, supra note 9, at 352 (describing the Monte Carlo algorithm used for these
simulations; it is implemented in the Clarify plug-in for Stata). To use these methods,
investigators need make no additional assumptions; that is, beyond those they make to perform
statistical inference. Id.
63. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries,and Patent Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000).
64. Id. at 365.
65. Id. at 367.
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Table 4
Jury Decisions
363 (68.1%)

Judge Decisions

Total

Patentee Prevails

343 (50.7%)

706

Infringee Prevails

170 (31.9%)

333 (49.3%)

503

Total

553

676

1,209

Jury Decisions

Judge Decisions

Total

363 (311)

343 (395)

706

170 (222)

333 (281)

503

553

676

1,209

Patentee Prevails

Infringee Prevails
Total
X2(1)= 36.28, P < .01

Table 4: Results of Kimberly A. Moore's examination of the outcome in patent trial
decisions, by party and adjudicator. The top panel shows the observed frequencies (with
column percentages in parentheses); the bottom panel shows the observed and expected
66
frequencies.

In attempting to convey her findings, Moore writes:
There is a significant difference in win rate when the jury decides patent claims. Hence,
the null hypothesis that "when a jury decides a patent claim there is an equal chance of
success for the patent holder and the infringer" can be rejected. There is not a
significant difference in the win rate, however, when the patent case is decided by a
judge. The null hypothesis that "when a judge decided a patent claim there is an equal
chance of success for the patent holder and the infringer" cannot be rejected. The
identity of the adjudicator,7 therefore, is a statistically significant predictor of who wins
6
the claims in the lawsuit.

To us this statement is as uninformative as "the coefficient on
'Conference Minority' is statistically significant at the .01 level." Far
better and certainly of more use to Moore and her audience is the
information conveyed in the bottom panel of Table 4. There we display
the observed and expected counts-that is, the counts we would expect
in each cell if no difference existed between judges and jurors.68 Now
the contrast in "win rates" just pops: In Moore's sample, patentees
won fifty-two more cases before juries than we would have anticipated
if no association existed between the decision maker and outcome-or
about a 17% increase in success.

66. Id. at 386 (providing the data from which these tables are produced).
67. Id. at 385.
68. Of course, the first step in computing the Pearson R2 is to calculate the expected count
within each cell.
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B. When PerformingInference, Convey Uncertainty
In a poll
released
on December
21,
2005, ABC
News/Washington Post reported that 54% of Americans (95% CI [±3])
thought the Senate should confirm Samuel Alito for a seat on the
Supreme Court. 69 Of course, the pollsters did not survey every
American; they rather made a statistical inference about all
Americans (the "population") by drawing a "sample" (N = 1003). In
other words, via an examination of a small piece of the world (1003
Americans) they attempted to learn about the entire world (all
Americans), and, assuming that they drew a random probability
sample, we can have some faith in the information they convey.
But there is more. When researchers draw random probability
samples, they also can communicate their degree of uncertainty about
the sample statistic (e.g., the 54% favoring Alito). Surveys reported in
the press, for example, typically convey this degree of uncertainty as
"the margin of error," which is usually a 95% confidence interval (or,
as we have written above, 95% CI). So when the press reports that
54% of respondents support Alito's confirmation with a +3 "margin of
error," they are supplying the level of uncertainty they have about the
sample statistic of 54%: here, that the true fraction of American
supporting Alito will be captured in the stated confidence interval (of
54 [+3] or 51-57%) in ninety-five of one hundred applications of the
same sampling procedure. Note that this information does not tell us
whether the population (parameter) lies within this range. What is
critical, though, is that if we continue to draw samples from the
population of Americans, the mean of the samples will eventually
equal the mean of the population, and if we graphed the mean of each
sample, we would see a shape resembling a normal distribution. This
is what enables us to make an inference-here, in the form of a
sample statistic and a margin of error-about how all Americans (the
population) feel about Alito by observing a single sample statistic
(54%).
When we read the results of surveys reported in the presssuch as the Alito survey-we have come to expect pollsters to convey
the level of uncertainty about their sample statistics. (If they did not,
we would be unable to judge their results. For example, consider a

69. Jon Cohen, Majority Wants Alito on Court; Most Also Want Roe to Remain, ABC NEWS,
Dec. 18, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/100la2AlitoandAbortion.pdf (last visited on
Nov 5, 2006) (explaining the results to the question: "As you may know, Bush has nominated
federal judge Samuel A. Alito to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. Do you think the U.S. Senate
should or should not confirm Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court?" in which 28 percent said
no and 19 percent had no opinion).
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survey reporting that 54% of Americans supported Alito, ±20(!)meaning it is entirely possible that a majority did not approve of his
candidacy.) We should expect the same of scholarship. That is, when
scholars perform statistical inference-as did Staudt, Epstein, et al.,
Roe, and Moore in the examples above-they too have an obligation to
convey their level of uncertainty. After all, because statistics are only
estimates developed from a sample of the world (and not from the
entire world) we can never be 100% certain that we got it right. Most
analysts take this obligation seriously but tend to rely on p values and
standard errors to do the work. This is unfortunate since neither
conveys information of much value. Take the omnipresent standard
error, for example the ".090" on the estimate of .329 in Table 3; all
that this error value supplies is an estimate of the standard deviation
of the estimated slope-which, standing alone, is of interest to almost
70
no one, readers and scientists alike.
It is thus hardly surprising that reporting the far-moremeaningful 95% (or even 99%) confidence interval rather than (or in
addition to) p values and standard errors has become de rigeur in
other disciplines, 7 1 and we recommend the same for law. Hence, in the
case of the Roe project, we suggest supplanting the standard error of
.090 with the 95% confidence interval; here, those values are a lower
bound of .136 and an upper bound of .522.
This interval, we believe, comes far closer than the standard
error to conveying what Roe wants: that his best guess about the
coefficient is .328 but he is "95 percent certain" that it is in the range
of .136 to .522. Because zero is not in this range (the confidence

70.
71.

Its value, rather, lies in its role in computing 95% confidence intervals.
See, e.g., POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 20 (applying the confidence interval standard

in politics). See also, e.g., THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, PUBLICATION MANUAL 21

(American Psychological Association 2001) (suggesting that authors include estimates of the
"effect
size");
CLINICAL
BIOMECHANICS,
Author
Gateway
Guide
for
Authors,
http://authors.elsevier.com/GuideForAuthors.html?PubID= 30397&dc=GFA (last visited Aug. 31,
2006) ("Confidence intervals are preferred over just P values."); DEV. PSYCH., Instructions to
Authors, http://www.apa.org/journals/dev/submission.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2006) (stating
that "for all study results, measures of both practical and statistical significance should be
reported; the latter can involve either a standard error or an appropriate confidence interval,"
but emphasizing "practical significance" or "effects" which "can be reported using an effect size, a
standardized regression coefficient, a factor loading, or an odds ratio"); J. OF VISUAL COMM. IN
MED., Instructions for Authors, http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/authors/cjauauth.asp
(last
visited Aug. 31, 2006) ("Statistical advice is available in STATISTICAL GUIDELINES FOR
CONTRIBUTORS TO MEDICAL JOURNALS. Confidence intervals are preferred over just P values.");
MOD. LANG. J., supra note 60 ("Ideally, the author will relate the effect size of the new study to
those of previous studies. Confidence intervals are generally appropriate for this purpose."); THE
NEW ENG. J. MED., Author Center, http://authors.nejm.orgMisc/NewMs.asp (last visited Aug. 31,
2006) ("Measures of uncertainty, such as confidence intervals, should be used consistently,
including in figures that present aggregated results.").
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interval), he (and we) can safely reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between a society's politics and ownership (without ever
providing a p value!). Likewise in the Epstein et al. study, rather than
reporting the standard error of .591 on the Conference Minority
variable, we suggest denoting the confidence interval around the
coefficient of 7.59 [6.43, 8.75]. (Hereinafter we use this notation [x,x]
to indicate the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval
around the estimate of the quantity of interest.)
But researchers would not be making the most of their
analyses. This is especially true in the case of Epstein and her
colleagues who estimated their model using logistic regression. If they
were to write that they are "95 percent certain" that the true logit
coefficient lies between 6.43 and 8.75, they would fail to speak clearly
and accessibly to their audience. What we commend instead is
combining the lesson here of relating uncertainty with the general
principle of conveying substantive information. In Epstein et al.'s case,
this translates into the following claim: All other things being equal,
the predicted probability of a justice switching his vote when he is in
the minority at conference is a whopping .79 [.71, .86]. For Roe it is
this: As we move from societies in the middle of the political spectrum
to those on the far right, diffusion of ownership increases by nearly
60%, from 47% [36.5, 57.2] to 75% [56.7, 92.4]. Now in both instances,
readers need no specialized knowledge to understand the results of
the study or the researchers' assessment of their uncertainty about
those results. As a result, they are in a far better position to evaluate
the study's findings.
By offering this advice, we do not mean to suggest that all data
projects must house assessments of uncertainty. Indeed, the principle
is "When Performing Inference, Convey Uncertainty," not "When
Describing Data, Convey Uncertainty." In other words, when
researchers are merely displaying, describing, or summarizing their
data-and not using the data they have collected to make inferences
about the population that may have generated the data-supplying
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standard errors or confidence intervals is not necessary. 72 Because this
suggestion has more bearing on the creation of graphical displays
(which we do not want to unnecessarily clutter with, say, confidence
intervals) we consider it in some detail in the next installment of this
article. Suffice it to note for now that when Moore described a basic
feature of her data-that patentees won 58% of the 1209 suits and
alleged infringers won 42%-we see no purpose to presenting the
associated uncertainty about those figures. If, on the other hand,
Moore seeks to generalize from those figures of 58 and 42% to cases
she has not collected (that is, to use her sample to make an inference),
then some measure of error is in order.
C. GraphData and Results
In a fascinating article in the HarvardLaw Review, Richard L.
Revesz attempts to demonstrate that different levels of preference for
environmental protection in the states-and not public choice
pathologies
that
cause
systematic
underrepresentation
of
environmental interests-help account for variation in states'

72. We take our cues here from Cleveland, though some scholars seem to disagree.
CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 213-15. But see, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 16, at
123 (transforming the following table, which originally appeared in an article by J.H. Ellenberg,
into the graph directly below it:
Raters' characterization
Negative (1-1.9)

23.9

Neutral (2-2.9)

52.2

Positive (>3)

23.9

Positive

Percent

Ell

Neutral

E

Negative
o

o

II

I

o

6

I

II

o

6

6

Characterization
If, from the table, the original author (Ellenberg) sought to make an inference about the ratings,
then the display of uncertainty in the graph would be warranted. If, however, Ellenberg only
sought to describe the data he collected, this step is probably overkill).
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willingness to pass protective measures.7 3 As part of that
demonstration, Revesz supplies a table (reproduced here as Table 5)
that summarizes ratings assigned by the League of Conservation
Voters ("LCV") to congressional representatives in each state, as well
as to the House delegation as a whole (the higher the score, the more
pro-environment the representative).
To be sure, this table communicates interesting information;
specifically, summary data on congressional voting (by state) over
protective environmental measures. Were we to take a long look, we
would see that the (lone) representative of Vermont always voted in
support of environmental protection, thereby propelling his state into
the number 1 ranking. The Oklahoma and Alabama delegations, in
contrast, never voted in favor of protective legislation.

73. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REV. 553 (2001).
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Table 5
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Median Democrat
.00
.80
.53
.93
1.00
.90
.83
.93
.93
.93
.73
.47
.80
.20
.33
.83
.83
.97
.87
.80
.40
.80
.73
1.00
.87
.93
.80
.56
.87
.87
.80
.93
.77
.47
.60
1.00
.47
.87
.47
.93
-

Median Republican
.00
.06
.07
.03
.07
.13
.83
.75
.13
.12
.06
.13'
.07
.10
.00
.07
.00
.37
.13
.40
.03
.10
.06
.13
.07
.27
.63
.03
.37
.07
.00
.00
.07
.07
.10
.06
.13
.00
.13
.07
.10
.20
.06

Median Overall
.00
.06
.07
.17
.57
.13
.90
.75
.27
.13
.93
.06
.67
.17
.20
.07
.07
.00
.83
.73
.97
.70
.73
.33
.33
.06
.13
.40
.27
.93
.07
.80
.20
.56
.20
.00
.87
.47
.93
.27
.06
.13
.10
.13
1.00
.20
.60
.47
.73
.06

Full House

.87

.07

.40

Rank
48
43
39
31
17
33
6
10
3
33
3
43
15
31
27
39
39
48
8
11
2
14
11
22
22
43
33
21
24
3
39
9
27
18
27
48
7
19
3
24
43
33
38
33
1
27
16
19
11
43

Table 5: Results of Richard L. Revesz's analysis of the League of Conservation Voter
records, by state delegations to the House of Representatives. Data are from 1999.
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"-" means that no members of the state delegation affiliated with the political party in
(in the "Median" columns), the more "proquestion. The higher the numbers
74
environment" the state delegation.

But is Table 5-or, rather, tables more generally-the best
way to convey this information? If our purpose is to provide readers
with the exact figures, then the answer is yes: tables always trump
graphs. Figure 4, which is a graphical display of Revesz's data
(specifically, dot plots of the state delegation medians), underscores
this point. While we can, from the table, observe that the
Pennsylvania delegation had a median score of exactly .47, we cannot
make that observation with the same degree of precision from the
figure.
Figure 4
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Rhode balrd

Southo

Massacthl
vmnohnt

WWoV1,40
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

018

0.0

1.0

0.2

North Central

0.4

0.6

0-8

West

South Dakofa
Kalsas
Nebraska

Atke
Idaho
Montana

lowa

Aftona
Now Mexco

Ohao
Noth Dakota

Nevada
Caftolia

Moddgan
Minnesmt
Wiscor"In

wasingon

OxcgorI
Hw,
m-

0.0

0.2

0A

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.0

0.2

0.4

0,6

0-8

Figure 4: Dot plots, by region, of Revesz's analysis of the League of Conservation Voter
records, by state delegations to the House of Representatives, by region (see Table 5).
75
Data are from 1999. These figures depict the overall House median.

74.
75.

1.0

Id. at 638.
Id.

1.0
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More often that not, though, the degree of precision that only
tables can convey is beside the point. Typically what we want to
communicate to our audience (and to ourselves) is not exact values but
comparisons, patterns, or trends. This certainly holds in the social
sciences, and it is not easy to identify an exception in law. At the least,
Revesz's article does not present an example of such an exception.
What he wants us to take away from Table 5 is not the precise
ranking of, say, Alaska's or North Dakota's delegation; he rather
hopes to convey a sense of the relative voting records of the
delegations (the highest support, the lowest, and so on) so that we can
eventually draw comparisons between federal and state legislative
support for environmental regulation. Surely, this purpose is better
served by Figure 4 than Table 5.
Indeed, Figure 4 allows us to detect crucial patterns in the data
that would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern from the tabular
display. So, for example, we can observe that states in the Northeast
are rather uniform supporters of the environment (with the exceptions
of New Hampshire and Pennsylvania). In contrast, the South consists
quite homogeneously of states that are not generally supportive of the
environment. States in the North Central region cluster into
essentially two groups, with North Dakota, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin appearing to be solid environmental
supporters, although not as strong as states in the Northeast. Distinct
groups also emerge in the West, with one set on the left of the
76
distribution and another to the right.
More generally, if the point is to draw attention to trends or to
77
make comparisons, as it almost always is, graph the data or results.
This advice reflects not only our own aesthetic preference but a
growing consensus among scholars in the statistical and social
sciences, 78 as well as journal editors. 79 Unless the author has a very
76. Another way to present geographic data is to shade states according to the intensity,
here, of environmental support. Such plots provide information about geographic contiguity but,
because they require readers to disentangle color gradients, they can obscure comparisons
between and among states.
77. See Gary Klass, Constructing Good Charts and Graphs, http:/Ililt.ilstu.edulgmklass/
pos138/datadisplay/sections/goodcharts.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
78. See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 23, at 4-6 (reviewing the advantages of graphs); Gelman et.
al., supra note 16, at 121 ("[W]e find well designed graphs to be superior to tables.") See also
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Gelman et. al., supra note 16, at 121 ("[A] new editor of Memory and Cognition
exhorted submitters to display data using well-designed graphs."). Also consider Suplee &
Bradford's "Science and Engineering Visualization Challenge" encouraging researchers to
rethink their data presentations for which, in asking for articles, they wrote "Data may be the
gold standard of science, but they don't exactly glitter. A neat table of values cannot convey the
significance, context, or excitement of research results to anyone besides other scientists in the

2006]

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

1843

compelling reason to provide precise information to readers-a task
better relegated to web sites than (precious) journal pages-"well
80
designed graphs are superior to tables."
This recommendation, we hasten to note, applies with equal
force to the presentation of results (e.g., Figure 1) and data (or
summaries of data) (e.g., Figure 4).81 It also applies to small amounts
of data. Despite Tufte's intuition that "tables outperform graphs when
reporting on small data sets of twenty numbers or less" and that the
"special power of graphics comes in the display of large data sets" 82
subsequent studies of perception have shown this questionable at
83
best.
Prove it to yourself by comparing the left and right panels of
Figure 5, both of which depict the estimated ideology of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals in 2000 (based on the ideology of the median judge
in each). In the left plot we reproduce the precise figures; in the right,
we graphically depict the percentages (both ordered from most liberal
to most conservative). Surely if we stared at the numbers (eight short
of Tufte's magic number of twenty) long enough, we could observe the
patterns that emerge from the graph--e.g., the ideological closeness of
the Second, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits on the left and the Fifth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits on the right, not to mention the gap
between the Sixth and the Third Circuits or the large difference
between the most liberal and most conservative courts. But it requires
far more unnecessary cognitive work.

same subfield. No one else quite gets the picture-including the larger community that supports
the global research enterprise". Curt Suplee & Monica Bradford, Visualization and the
Communication of Science, 301 SCIENCE 1472, 1473 (2003).
80. Gelman et al., supra note 16, at 121.
81. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 215 (describing the only distinction the
authors would draw as centering on the need to convey uncertainty). In keeping with our advice
above, figures depicting results should also display confidence intervals. When the goal is simply
to show the data, "then show the data," without conveying uncertainty. Id.
82. TUFrE, supra note 22, at 56 (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Gelman at. al., supra note 16, at 121-22 (debating the common wisdom that
tables are more effective for smaller sets of data); Douglas Gillian et al., Guidelines for
Presenting Quantitative Data in HFES Publications, 40 HUM. FACTORS 28, 29 (1998) (positing
that graphs may be superior to tables even for small sets of data); Spence & Lewandowsky, supra
note 26, at 76 (finding that graphical displays had an advantage over tables, pie charts, and bar
graphs).
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Figure 5
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Figure 5: Estimated ideology of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 2000. Both panels display
the estimated ideology of the median member of the circuit court in 2000, where ideology
is from most liberal (here, labeled as -0.2) to most conservative (labeled as 0.4). Though
it is possible from the table to observe the patterns that jump out in the graph-e.g., the
ideological closeness of the Second, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits on the left and the Fifth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits on the right-it requires far more (unnecessary) cognitive
84
work.

84. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming in
2007.), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (identifying data
regarding the appointment of judges); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger, & Todd Peppers,
Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and PartisanSelection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623
(2001) (describing an analytical approach in which ideological estimates are based on the
ideology of the median member of the circuit, where ideology is defined as follows: If a judge is
appointed from a state where the President and at least one home-state Senator are of the same
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IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR VISUALIZING DATA AND RESULTS

With these general principles now noted, we turn to the
challenge of putting them into practice. In the next installment of this
article, we outline specific strategies for presenting data and results.
As we have suggested throughout, these are distinct tasks and so, to
some degree, require distinct rules.
On the other hand, reflecting our view that graphs are
generally superior to tables, we center both discussions on
visualization via pictures. Hence we begin here with three basic rules
that apply to all figures regardless of whether the task is to present
data or results: (1) Aim for Clarity and Impact, (2) Iterate, and (3)
Write Detailed Captions. These are critical to the enterprise of
graphing data and results if only because, as Cleveland notes,
"Visualization is surprisingly difficult. Even the most simple matters
can easily go wrong."8 5 Following these suggestions will, we hope,
increase the odds of matters both simple and complex going right.

And go right for both the audience and the researcher. In other
words, in the sections to follow, we do not differentiate between
graphs for purposes of "prospecting" (that is, as part of the data
analysis process) and "transferring" (that is, for communicating data
and results)-even though some scholars do. Actually, more than a
handful have argued that "different kinds of displays are needed"
8 6
depending on whether the researcher is prospecting or transferring.
We take the point: Just as the depiction of data and the
depiction of results are distinct tasks, so too are the enterprises of
analyzing a data set and presenting it. By way of example, consider
"Anscombe's Quartet"-a famous demonstration set out by the
statistician Francis Anscombe in 1973.87 After listing four "fictitious"
data sets-all of which consisted of eleven observations of one
dependent and one independent variable-Anscombe presented the
estimates, along with other summary statistics, of a linear regression
analysis for each. Those estimates, as we depict in the caption of

party, the nominee is assigned the ideology (NOMINATE Common Space score) of the homestate Senator (or the average of the home-state Senators if both members of the delegation are
from the President's party). If neither home-state Senator is of the President's party, the
nominee receives the ideology (NOMINATE Common Space) score of the appointing President).
85. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 9.
86. Howard Wainer, Graphical Visions from William Playfair to John Tukey, 5 STAT. SCI.
340, 345 (1990); see also JACOBY, supra note 23, at 2 (differentiating between analytic graphs
and presentation graphs, though noting that "carefully constructed analytic graphs also are quite
effective for presentational purposes").
87. F.J. Anscombe, Graphs in StatisticalAnalysis, 27 AM. STATISTICIAN 17, 19-20 (1973).
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Figure 6, are identical for the four data sets. But the underlying data
in each are hardly identical, as the four plots in the figure make clear.
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Figure 6
Figure 6: Taken collectively, the four panels form "Anscombe's Quartet"--a famous
demonstration set out by the statistician Francis Anscombe in 1973. While the plots are
quite distinct, the four data sets they represent each produce: (1) the same means on
both the y and x variables (2) the same slope and intercept estimates in a regression of y
on x, and (3) the same R2 and F values. Anscombe's point was to underscore the
importance of graphing data before analyzing it. By creating the four plots, Anscombe
was able to check the assumptions of his linear regression model, and he found them
wanting for three of the four data sets (all but the top left), 8

88.

The data are from Anscombe, id.
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Anscombe's point, of course, was to underscore the importance
of graphing data before analyzing it. By creating the plots displayed in
Figure 6, Anscombe was able to check the assumptions of his linear
regression model, and found that they were violated in three of the
four data sets (all but the top left panel). At the same time, though, his
demonstration illustrates a point made by proponents of the
"prospecting" versus "transferring" school: no doubt researchers in
Anscombe's position would not "transfer" (i.e., present) all the plots
they made during the data-analytic phase of their work. Many, if not
most, would never see life beyond their designers' computer screens.
But to us this is the only major distinction between graphs
designed for exploratory purposes and for presentation. We thus agree
with Cleveland and others who suggest that while researchers may
create more pictures when they are prospecting, the same general
principles of graphic design apply regardless of the researcher's
purpose.8 9 Or, as Jacoby put it, "It is my experience that carefully
constructed analytic graphs also are quite effective for presentational
purposes." 90 And so it is to those principles for careful construction
(and impact) that we now turn.
A. Aim for Clarityand Impact
In 1983 the graphic designer Edward Tufte issued his now
(in)famous edict: when creating visual displays, "maximize the dataink ratio," where "data-ink" is "the non-erasable core of a graphic, the
non-redundant ink ... ."91 Surely, with these words Tufte was
pushing researchers to strive for clarity in their graphs-no doubt an
important goal. When we construct figures, we encode information.
What we ask of our readers is to visually decode that information; if
they cannot do that because our display lacks clarity, our graph fails.
92
Pure and simple.

89. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 1; see also John W. Tukey, Data-Based
Graphics: Visual Display in the Decades to Come, 5 STAT. SC. 327, 331 (1990) (seeming to agree
with Cleveland, but vacillating). On the one hand, Tukey writes that "[tihere is no reason why a
good strategy for prospecting will also be a good strategy for transfer." Id. On the other, Tukey
claims that "[w]e all need to be clear that visual display can be very effective in serving two quite
different functions [prospecting and transferring]." Id. He goes on to point out that the major
difference between the two "is in prospecting's freedom to use multiple pictures." Id.
90. JACOBY, supra note 23, at 2.
91. TUFTE, supra note 22, at 93, 96.
92. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 64-67; see also TUFTE, supra note 22, at 55 ("A
graphic does not distort if the visual representation of the data is consistent with the numerical
representation.").
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It turns out, though, that following Tufte's advice to the letter
can have precisely the opposite effect: minimizing redundant ink may
lead to inelegant, even silly, looking graphs that actually violate the
principle of clarity. John W. Tukey, perhaps the most important
contemporary figure in scientific graphing, 93 neatly made this point by
comparing his now-famous box plot with Tufte's recommended
revision (see Figure 7).94 It is no therefore no surprise that, to our
knowledge, no researcher has adopted the Tufte revision: By
maximizing the data-ink ratio-thereby deemphasizing the "central
clumping" of a distribution that the box is designed to highlight-it
minimizes clarity.9 5
Figure 7
-

"-

Maximum

Quartile

Median

•

Quartile
_ _Minimum
Figure 7: This figure shows two versions of a box plot, which Tukey created to display a
visual summary of the distribution of a single variable. The left panel depicts Tukey's
classic version (where the adjacent values are the minimum and maximum values in the
data set); the right panel shows Tufte's revision, which he designed to maximize "dataink." By eliminating the box, the Tufte plot may not sufficiently emphasize the middle
96
half of a given distribution. It also lacks the visual impact of Tukey's original design.

93. See, e.g., TUKEY, supra note 35. However, it's possible that Tukey is best known for
inventing the word "software." See David Leonhardt, John Tukey, 85, Statistician; Coined the
Word 'Software,'N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2000, at A19.
94. Tukey, supra note 89, at 329.
95. See generally Tukey, supra note 89, at 329 (exploring potential advances in computergenerated visual display).
96. Tukey's original box plot appears in TUKEY, supra note 35, at 48. Tufte's redesign is in
TUFrE, supra note 22, at 125. The caption draws on Tukey's critique of Tufte. See Tukey, supra
note 89, at 328-29.
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The Tufte version also strips the box plot of its impact-hardly
97
a trivial matter if we hope "to enforce the attention" of our readers.
As Tukey famously put it, "The greatest possibilities of visual display
lie in the vividness and inescapability of the intended message. 9 8s He
further wrote that Tufte's "less is more aesthetic" can interfere with
the realization of those possibilities-and we agree. 99 While we
certainly do not want to encourage researchers to create the "multicolored, three-dimensional pie charts that clutter the pages of USA
Today, Time, and Newsweek," 100 neither do we want them to sacrifice
impact. Indeed, had William Playfair (1759-1823), Charles Joseph
Minard (1781-1870), and E.J. Marey (1830-1904)-three eminent
developers of scientific graphs whose work Tufte seems to admire1 0110 2
failed to focus on impact, there would be little to admire.
Figure 8, in which we reproduce one of Playfair's most famous
graphs in the top panel and a "less is more" version in the bottom
panel, highlights this claim. No one could deny that the top is flawed
in any number of ways,10 3 nor could we say that the bottom fails to
maximize the data-ink ratio. But the result in the bottom, though
cleaner, is far less memorable.

97. Tukey, supra note 89, at 328.
98. Id. at 328. As several scholars point out, Playfair agreed. E.g., Costigan-Eaves &
Macdonald-Ross, supra note 16, at 319 ("Along with Playfair's desire to tell the story of history
graphically was the desire to tell it dramatically."); see also Wainer, supra note 86, at 341-43.
99. To be fair, it is not even clear that Tufte would follow his own maxim under all
circumstances. On the final page of his classic, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE
INFORMATION, TUFTE, supra note 22, at 191, he wrote: "Design is choice. The theory of the visual
display of quantitative information consists of principles that generate design options and that
guide choices among options. The principles should not be applied rigidly or in a peevish spirit;
they are not logically or mathematically certain; and it is better to violate any principle than to
place graceless or inelegant marks on paper."
100. This sentiment is adopted from Wainer, supra note 86, at 341 ("Austerity may serve
certain purposes, but humans often prefer, even require, more. Although I shudder to consider it,
perhaps there is something to be learned from the success enjoyed by the multi-colored, threedimensional pie charts that clutter the pages of USA Today, Time, and Newsweek. I sure hope
not much.").
101. TUFTE, supra note 22, at 32, 34 (calling Playfair one of "the two great inventors of
modern graphical design" and deeming Marey's graphs "superb[ly] constructed"). Of Minard's
famous depiction of the Napoleon army in Russia, Tufte said "it may well be the best statistical
graph ever drawn." Id. at 40.
102. Wainer, supra note 86, at 341; see also Tukey, supra note 89, at 333 ("What would, for
instance, an unremitting emphasis on 'data-ink ratio' leave of the famous [Minard] Napoleon-inand-out-of-Russia chart?").
103. For a critique, see Michael Friendly & Howard Wainer, Nobody's Perfect, 17 CHANCE 51,
51-53 (2004).
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Figure 8

/'............................

7t

Figure 8: Both panels convey information about the labor required to buy wheat in
England, 1565-1820. The top panel, the original produced by William Playfair in 1786,
shows three time series: 1) the reigns of English monarchs, 2) the price of a quarter of
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wheat (in the bars), and 3) the wages of a good mechanic (the line). 10 4 The bottom panel
is Friendly and Wainer's redesign of Playfair's chart. The dots on the connected line
show the number of weeks required to buy one quarter of wheat; the solid line is a fitted
quadratic.1 05 While the bottom panel has the virtue of clarity, some might contend that,
10 6
relative to Playfair's plot, it lacks visual impact or the "ability to enforce attention."

So how can researchers aim for clarity and impact? First, and
foremost, they must eliminate what Tukey deems "busyness," what
Tufte has famously labeled "chart junk," or what Cleveland calls
"visual clutter"-in other words, irrelevant or distracting elements
that stand in the way of decoding. Second, they should not
underestimate their readers by dumbing down graphs and thus
potentially muting the impact of their displays.
1. Eliminate Distracting Elements
If there is one principle of visualization on which graphic
designers, statisticians, and social scientists agree, it is that
researchers should eliminate irrelevant, distracting elements from
their displays. And there is plenty to eliminate in the law reviews. We
make this point in Figures 9 through 12, which depict some of the
more common problems, as well as our correctives for eliminating
superfluity-that is, for making the data stand out. 107
Beginning with Figure 9, from Cloud et al.'s experimental work
on whether the mentally disabled can understand Miranda
warnings, 0 8 we eliminate the depth cue (i.e., we transform the graph
from 3-D to 2-D). The added dimensionality is not only irrelevant to
the data display; research (experimental research, ironically enough)
has found that it can interfere with graph comprehension. 10 9 It is for
these reasons that scholars in most other disciplines, and even graphic
designers working for popular publications, are now eradicating
superfluous dimensions-and we recommend that law professors
follow suit.

104. The Playfair chart appears in all three editions of AGRICULTURAL DISTRESSES (1822).
See Costigan-Eaves & Mcdonald-Ross, supra note 16, at 322; TUFrE, supra note 22, at 34
(reproducing the Playfair chart).
105. The chart is from Friendly & Wainer, supranote 103, at 53.
106. Tukey, supra note 89, at 328.
107. This is a general problem; others are more specific to particular types of graphs. Details
will be discussed in the future article.
108. Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 539 (2002).
109. See, e.g., Martin H. Fischer, Do Irrelevant Depth Cues Affect the Comprehension of Bar
Graphs? 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 151, 161 (2000).
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Figure 9: Both panels depict the percentage of correct results on three exams
administered to the mentally disabled and nondisabled. The left panel is a reproduction
of the original graph that appeared in Cloud, et al.; the panel on the right reflects our
attempt to reduce clutter. Specifically, we eliminated (1) the depth cue, (2) the internal
data labels, (3) tick marks on the horizontal axis, and (4) the legend. We also have
reduced the number of tick marks on the vertical axis and supplanted the crosshatching
with a solid color. The result is a graph far easier to decode but that still conveys the
110
authors' message.

Note that removing the depth cue is not the only change we
made to Cloud's original figure. We further reduced clutter by, first,
eliminating the internal data labels (e.g., 30%, 87%). As far as we can
tell, the authors' primary purpose is to focus their audience on the
comparison between the two groups of test takers, not on precise
values, and so those values are unnecessary (if we are wrong, then
Cloud et al. would have been better off with a table). Second, we
110. The original graph and data are from Cloud et al., supra note 108, at 539.
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altered the tick marks on both axes, eliminating those on the
horizontal (verbal descriptors need not be "ticked") and reducing by
half the number on the vertical axis (typically, according to
visualization studies, three to ten marks are sufficient).11 1 Third, and
again in line with extant work on graphic perception, not to mention
good design practice, we filled the bars with a solid gray color rather
than cross hatches, slanted lines, or other "pop-art" marks that can
appear to vibrate. 112 Finally, we eliminated the legend. It too is
unnecessary, and it can also interfere with decoding because of the
tendency to look back and forth between the key and the data.
In Figure 9 we moved the legend to the heading. An alternative
is to describe the data keys in the caption. This is an acceptable, even
standard, practice (for more on the use of captions, see infra Part IV.
C). Nonetheless, if it is possible to insert labels into the interior of the
graph without interfering with visual assembly of the plotting symbols
or lines, we recommend that step 1 13-and have taken it in Figure 10.
Note that the labels neither cause too much clutter nor obscure the
data. Actually, because the reader need not consult a key (and, in this
instance, a legend that actually interferes with decoding), they
improve visualization-here, a comparison of criminal and civil cases
filed per authorized judge.

111. See, e.g., CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 39.
112. See, e.g., TUFrE supra note 22, at 107 ("Contemporary optical art relies on moir6 effects,
in which the design interacts with the physiological tremor of the eye to produce the distracting
appearance of vibration and movement."). Tufte also argues that moir6 vibration, caused by cross
hatching and other nonsolid fill types, makes for "bad data graphics." Id. at 108-11. See also
Tukey, supra note 89, at 332 (suggesting that one "avoid slanted lines within the elements").
113. See CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 44-45 for more on this point.
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Figure 10: Both panels depict the number of criminal and civil cases filed per
authorized judge, 1934-1999. The top panel is the original graph that appeared in a law
review article by Michael Simons; the bottom panel reflects our attempt to improve
visualization of the data. Specifically, we eliminated the legend (replacing it with
internal data labels) and the dark grid, both of which obscure the data. We also reduced
the number of tick marks and associated labels. Finally, we supplanted the non-circular
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sub-elements with circular connectors, though if the author's
purpose is merely to show
1 14
trends in new filings, the circles may be unnecessary.

Also observe that in altering the top panel of Figure 10, we
changed the symbols connecting the lines from non-circular to circular
elements. While many graphing packages offer users a dazzling array
of plotting symbols, such as squares, triangles, diamonds, and so on,
researchers should avoid almost all of them. More to the point,
experimental results show that "unless there is a serious need for
more distinctions," 115 analysts should stick to circular forms.
Typically, they can gain sufficient variation in the size and fill of
circles to display prominently the data. If not, as we explain
momentarily, we recommend a series of smaller plots within a single
figure.
Now observe what we did not change about original Figure 10.
First, we retained the horizontal axis as "New Filings" and the
vertical, as "Year". This conforms to standard practice of placing
explanatory variables on the x- (horizontal) axis and outcomes on the
y- (vertical) axis. 116 Some exceptions to this convention do exist,
however, most notably when a verbal descriptor accompanies each
case. Figure 11, in which the author, Richard Lazarus, provides
"environmental protection scores" for each justice, is an example. 117
Rather than running the descriptors (the names of the justices)
vertically and within the bars (which interferes with visualization) we
created a dot plot.

114. The original graph and data are from Michael A. Simons, ProsecutorialDiscretionand
Prosecution Guidelines:A Case Study in ControllingFederalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 914
fig.4, 964-65 (2000).
115. Tukey, supra note 89, at 332-33; see also CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 15464.
116. See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 16, at 122 (noting that this is the standard
convention).
117. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 725, 812 (2000).
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Figure 11: Both panels depict environmental protection scores developed by Richard J.
Lazarus. The score is the number of pro-environmental votes cast by the justice over the
total number of votes multiplied by one hundred. The top panel is a reproduction of the
original graph that appeared in Lazarus' article; the bottom panel reflects our attempt
to improve visualization of the data. Specifically, we transformed the chart into a dot
plot so that the labels are easy to read and do not obscure the data. We also changed the
tick marks, eliminated the value displays, reordered the justices (from lowest to highest
level of support for environmental protection)-all with an eye toward facilitating
118
comparisons.

A second feature of Figure 10 (that is, the Simons figure on
civil and criminal filings) that we did not change was the ordering of
the labels on the horizontal axis, from the earliest (1934) to the latest
(1999) year in the data set. Again, this is standard procedure for a
time series plot of this sort but not for many other data displays. In
fact, more typically researchers should order the labels by decreasing
frequency (or another substantively motivated pattern), not, for
example, alphabetically or even by time, as this can obscure
interesting patterns. 119 Figure 4 (Revesz's figure) provides an example
of an ordering that we changed to facilitate comparison, as does
Figure 11. Lazarus placed the justices according to their date of
appointment to the Court, but because his textual description focused
on a comparison of the justices' scores across time, we ordered them by
increasing support for the environment. Now, at the very least, the
display draws attention to patterns of central concern to the author.
Finally, returning to Figure 10, note that we retained both the
"Civil" and "Criminal" lines in a single picture. Because they do not
clutter the display this is a reasonable decision here. But in other
cases, graphing too much in one scale rectangle can obscure the data
and should be avoided. 120 The easiest solution is to juxtapose smaller
graphs within a single display. 121
We followed this strategy in plotting Revesz's data (Figure 4),
and we take it again in Figure 12, which we have drawn from Epstein
et al.'s analysis on Senate voting over nominees to the Supreme
Court. 122 The point of the original graph (in the top panel) is to show
118. Id.
119. See Gelman et al., supra note 16, at 122 (noting that display axes should be labeled such
that interesting patterns are highlighted).
120. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 35-36.
121. See id. at 38-39 (noting that juxtaposition allows the reader to clearly see each set of
data); see also Gelman et al., supra note 16, at 122 ("Mhe most crucial tool is probably the
juxtaposition of many small plots into a single figure .... "); EDWARD R. TUFTE, ENVISIONING
INFORMATION 53 (1990) (noting that separating data can reduce noise and enrich the content of
displays); Tukey, supra note 89, at 332 ("Be ready to avoid busyness by splitting one picture into
two or more.").
122. Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees, 68 J. POLITICS 296, 301 (2006).

2006]

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

1859

the predicted probability of a senator casting a yea vote over the range
of a nominee's qualifications (0 indicates most qualified and 1
indicates least qualified), when the ideological distance between the
senator and candidate is set at minimum, mean, and maximum levels.
But the error bars (representing 95% confidence intervals) and the
dark grid are so interfering that it is nearly impossible to get much of
a feel for the range the bars represent, not to mention for the
predicted probabilities. 123 There are so many lines that the message
gets lost: the results do not sufficiently stand out. We cleared away the
clutter by creating the four smaller plots depicted in the bottom panel
and lightening the grid. Now the predicted probabilities (and error
bars) are far easier to perceive, as are patterns in the results.

123. This example tracks Cleveland's approach in THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA. See
CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 38-40 (illustrating this method by separating one

cluttered graph into three juxtaposed panels of data).
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Figure 12: Both panels depict the results of a multivariate model of Senate voting over
Supreme Court nominees Specifically, they show the probability of a senator casting a
yea vote over the range of a nominee's qualifications (0 indicates most qualified and 1
indicates least qualified), when the ideological distance between the senator and
candidate is set at minimum, mean, and maximum levels. In both panels the vertical
(capped) lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The top panel attempts to graph all
three lines (minimum, mean, and maximum ideological distance, respectively) in the
same picture; the bottom panel juxtaposes the lines in four panels.
The smaller plots
1 24
(along with a lightening of the dark grid) facilitate comparisons.

Note, though, that in creating the smaller panels, we followed
Cleveland's advice that "superposed data sets must be readily visually
discriminated."'1 25 Accordingly, in each panel, the scales are identical,
as are the gridlines and number of tick marks. Indeed, all that differs
among the panels are the plotting symbols.
2. Trust Your Readers
The suggested revisions to Figures 9 through 12 have the
benefit of reducing clutter and thus enhancing the reader's ability to
decode the information they house. But the alterations do not-at
least we hope not-have the effect of dumbing down the graphs. We
have more faith in our readers than that and indeed, the principle we
sought to follow in redesigning them is "Aim for Clarity and Impact,
not Aim For Simplicity and Impact." To put it another way, to us,
Strunk & White's advice for writers applies equally to graphic design:
''no one can write decently who is distrustful of the reader's
intelligence, or whose attitude is patronizing."'126
Some scholars disagree, arguing that we ought judge graphs by
their simplicity- by how many words they save or by how fast
viewers can comprehend them. But these criteria are far too
restrictive. As Tukey pithily writes, "A picture may be worth a
thousand words, but it may take a hundred words to do it."127 And
Cleveland speaks to the issue of speedy comprehension: "While there
is a place for rapidly-understood graphs, it is too limiting to make
speed a requirement in science and technology, where the use of
graphs ranges from detailed, in-depth data analysis to quick
8
presentation." 12

124. The underlying statistical model and the data used to construct the graphs is from
Epstein et al., supra note 122, at 301.
125. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 50.
126. TUF TE, supra note 22, at 81 (quoting WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE
ELEMENTS OF STYLE 70 (1st ed. 1959)).
127. Wainer, supra note 86, at 341.
128. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 94.
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The same, we believe, applies to the social sciences and law. To
argue otherwise would be to would be to eliminate classes of graphs
(e.g., scatterplot matrices) that may require careful study but are
otherwise extremely valuable, effective, and memorable. Likewise,
elevating simplicity-a symptom, really, of lacking faith in our
audience-can lead to graphs that lack clarity and elegance. So, for
example, out of a belief that readers will not look at tick mark labels
129
and will instead apply "the most trivial of quantitative reasoning
researchers often feel compelled to start their scales with (an
unnecessary) zero. 130 As we show in Figure 13, not only does this
disrespect our audience and waste space (we should aim to fill the
data rectangle) but it also may interfere with decoding. In this case,
the author, Christopher Schroeder, wants to draw attention to the
decline in Americans' trust of the government.131 The trend he
identifies seems real enough, but because he makes use of zero it is
the
hardly discernible. Displaying the line more sensibly, as we do in132
middle panel, facilitates a more effective judgment about the data.

129. Id.

at 78 (responding to DARRELL HUFF, HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 64-65 (1954),

which claims that excluding zero is downright dishonest).
130. We refer here to graphs that do not require zero. Of course, when zero is relevant,
researchers must include it. See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 16, at 122 (noting that zero is a
relevant baseline in their research).
131. Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation,
51 DUKE L.J. 307, 346 (2001).
132. See CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 80-82 (illustrating a similar example of
removing zero in order to "convey much more quantitative information").
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Figure 13: All three panels show the Trust in Government Index (developed from the
American National Election Studies) on the vertical axis and year (from 1958-2000) on
the horizontal axis. From the top panel, which appears in Schroeder's study, it is
difficult to observe the decline in trust over time. We excluded zero in the middle pattern
to facilitate a more effective judgment about the data, and did not connect 1958 to 1964
to accentuate data sparseness. A problem in both the top and middle panels, however, is
that neither clearly delineates missing years. Accordingly, in the bottom panel we
data, as well as the fact that the
moved to a bar chart. Now readers can observe missing
13 3
Index is available only for even-numbered years.

This is just one example of how incorrect assumptions about
the na~vet6 of our readers can interfere with principles of sound
graphic design. Others are easy enough to summon, but the larger
point is that we not only should but must assume that our audience
will look closely at the graphs and understand them. Without this
assumption, as Cleveland notes, "graphical communication would be
far less useful."' 3 4 Actually, we would go further and ask why we

133. The top panel appeared in Schroeder, supra note 131, at 347; the Trust in Government
Index is available at http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a-5.htm.
134. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 79.
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should bother with graphs or even tabular displays if we believe our
readers will not bother to peruse them?
On the other hand, we are certainly not advocating that
researchers fool their audience or themselves. And it is along these
lines that line charts in the top and middle panels of Figure 13 are
troubling. Because the author chose a connected line graph, it may
well appear that data exist for each year between 1958 and 2000 (and
the alternate tick marks in the original [top] panel do not help!). But
this is not the case: The American National Election survey, from
where the Trust in Government Index comes, is fielded only every
other year (and the Index was not computed at all for 1960 and 1962).
By moving to a bar chart, in the bottom panel of Figure 13, we are
better able to alert readers to these "missing" years in the data set.
B. Iterate
To arrive at the bottom panel of Figure 13, we iterated,
creating two (or more) depictions of the same data until we generated
the clearest and most effective presentation. This is typical of graph
making: In our experience, it is nearly impossible (whether for
purposes of prospecting or transferring) to get it right on the first try.
Practically, this means that it is necessary to have software that can
easily reproduce graphs from scripts and provide fine control over all
elements.
Consider another, perhaps more typical, example of the
iterative process in action. In the top panel of Figure 14, we place a
graph that appeared in Tanya Kateri Hern~ndez's article on the role
of "race ideology" in the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in the
United States and Latin America. 135 Though by no means a horrid
visualization of the data, it contains a sufficient number of irrelevant
or obscuring elements to make decoding difficult. Comparison and
pattern detection are also no easy tasks because of the way the author
ordered the data: alphabetically (which facilitates the look up of
particular states, but not comparisons) rather than by magnitude.
Finally, because of the distribution's range (from zero to 3424) some of
the smaller data points (e.g., Nebraska) are difficult to see. A few
alterations are thus in order.
The bottom left panel represents our first attempt at improving
visualization. We have removed some irrelevant elements and
135. Tanya Kateri Herndndez, Multiracial Matrix. The Role of Race Ideology in the
Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1172 (2002). We took the liberty of using the states' full names rather
than their postal abbreviations, which Hernindez had displayed.
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reordered the states, but the product remains less-than-satisfying; in
particular, it is still difficult to discern within-state comparisons
between 1999 and 2000. To correct the problem, we moved away from
bar charts altogether and to a dot plot in the bottom right panel. Now,
the result is a graph that is far easier to decode but took two iterations
(actually many more) to create
Figure 14
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Figure 14: All three panels show Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") race charges filed, 1999-2000 by state. In all three lighter bars or dots are
1999; the darker bars or dots are 2000. The top panel appears in Tanya Kateri
Hernindez's article. Because the extraneous elements interfere with decoding, we
eliminated them; we also reordered the states to enable readers to observe patterns in
the data. The result, in the left bottom panel, is a more readable graph but one that still
obstructs within-state comparisons for the years 1999 and 2000. To improve further
comprehension and pattern detection, we moved to the dot plot depicted in the right
bottom panel. Moreover, to enhance readability, we have presented states with more
than one hundred EEOC race charges. If regional pattern were of interest, the data
could be organized geographically (see Figure 4). The sequence of charts shores up
Cleveland's advice: "... we should not hesitate to make two or more graphs of the same
1 36
data."

136. Id. at 1170-72; CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 94.
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C. Write Detailed Captions
For Figure 14 (and, in fact, for all the figures throughout this
article), we wrote a detailed caption. This is standard operating
procedure in many disciplines but not yet in law. 137 Indeed, our
inspection of the legal publications turned up captions that were at
best unhelpful guides to the figure and at worst, non-existent.
Illustrative is Figure 15, which we recreated from data in
Wagner & Petherbridge's rigorous study of Federal Circuit's
methodological approaches to claim construction. 138 While the data
and methods throughout the article are entirely appropriate, this
figure, absent any guidance from the authors, is difficult to interpret.
We offer a corrective, in the form of a detailed caption that first
explains what the graph displays and then draws "the reader's
attention to salient features of the display."1 39 Note that we do not
clutter the graph with a legend; again, following standard practice, we
provide a key in the caption.
More generally, we commend to you Cleveland's advice that
captions should be "comprehensive and informative."' 140 To wit, they
should contain (some version of) the following information:
1. A description of everything in the display.
2. A sentence or two on particularly important features of the data or results.

137. Consider the following "Figure Captions" guidelines for manuscripts submitted to the
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION ("JASA"):

Each figure must have a figure caption, including the figure number. Figures are
numbered consecutively, using arabic numerals, as they are cited in text.
Prepare the captions on a separate sheet and place them after the tables. They will be
typeset and placed beneath the figures.
Figures must be clearly described. The combined information of the figure caption and
the text of the body of the paper should provide a clear and complete description of
everything that is on the figure. Detailed captions can often be of great help to the
reader. First, describe completely what is graphed in the display; then draw the
reader's attention to salient features of the display and briefly state the importance of
these features.
Generally, it is a good idea to include the key to symbols in the caption to avoid
cluttering the display. Abbreviations not already defined in text must be defined in
the caption.
Figures and their titles are editorially reviewed. The following examples illustrate
these guidelines.
American Statistical Association Style Guide, http://www.amstat.org/publications/index.cfm?
fuseaction=style-guide (example omitted).
138. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of JudicialPerformance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1150 (2004).
139. American Statistical Association Style Guide, supra note 137.
140. CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 56.
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141

On the other hand, we want to encourage flexibility: Captions
will (and should) vary with the type of display and the data or results
being displayed. Also, of course, it is possible to overdo a caption by
providing too much (extraneous) information. But we cannot stress
enough that, as a general principle, law professors will well serve their
142
audience with a graph that is as self-contained as possible.
Figure 15
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141. We adapt this advice from the American Statistical Association Style Guide, supra note
137, and from CLEVELAND, ELEMENTS, supra note 26, at 57.
142. In its instructions to authors, the JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note
20, makes this point as well: "Tables and figures should stand on their own. When appropriate,
authors should include an explanatory note for a table or figure. The goal is to have the table or
figure 'stand on its own' so that a busy reader can understand the table without reading the
whole article."
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Figure 15: Both panels depict the percentage of opinions issued by the Federal Circuit
that employed a holistic methodology in claim construction, by bin, 1996-2002. Bins are
ordered chronologically, such that each bin represents two to four months of opinions
during the period of study and each bin contains eighteen or nineteen opinions. Note
that in the top panel, reproduced from R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge's article, the
authors included a data table and used a connected line graph. In the bottom panel, we
removed the data table; it is unnecessary and distracting. We also eliminated the lines
since they convey a sense of connection that is not necessarily reflected in the data. In
the bottom panel the circles represent the percentage of court opinions falling into each
bin; the line is a local regression (loess) line, which shows a slight decline in the
percentage of opinions making use of a holistic, as opposed to a procedural, methodology
in the first ten bins and in the last eight. 143

V. CONCLUSION

As quantitative empirical work is gaining traction in the legal
academic community, and as members of that community are
producing empirical work of increasingly high quality, the time has
come to consider questions of communication.
Here we have attempted to do just that by supplying general
suggestions for improving the presentation of empirical analyses. In
143. The top panel and data are from Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 138, at 1150.
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the next installment, we move to more specific strategies for
communicating data and results, though we emphasize the latter.
This reflects our belief, echoed throughout this Article, that an
emphasis on sterile statistical results without an interrogation of their
substantive importance disservices the research, the researchers, and
their readers. On the other hand, analysts that assess the effect of
their findings and are able to effectively and accessibly communicate
that information will find the payoffs considerable.
Our goal in the Article to follow is to help scholars achieve that
end, as well as to encourage editors of law reviews to ensure that they
do. Hence, not only do we offer a set of strategies for researchers, but
also a set of protocols centering on the presentation of statistical
results for implementation by legal publications.

